Germany’s Isolation Due to Irresponsible Foreign And Security Policy
By Alex Kohler, Pirate Party Germany
Germany’s goal in its foreign and security policy should primarily be to promote cooperation in this area in Europe and to pursue common European security interests. This also means showing consideration for its EU partners. The SPD and the SPD-led Foreign Ministry in particular propagate a common European foreign policy, but the exact opposite is being done here. As in other areas where resilience is required [1], such as disaster control or pandemic preparedness, the state is expected to recognize dangers early, act with foresight, and coordinate countermeasures with partners.
Active division of the EU
One example of how the German side is actively working on ways to blackmail and divide the EU is the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline project. Now one wonders:
- What does this project, so highly praised, advertised and hailed as a bridge and peace project, especially by SPD ministers, SPD state governments (and former SPD ministers and prime ministers), have to do with such sinister words as blackmail potential?
- Why build the pipeline – already starting with Nord Stream 2004 – in the Baltic Sea directly between Germany and Russia?
- Why can’t a “bridge” be built across the states of Eastern and Central Europe?
- Why not use the existing routes (since the 1970s) and build more pipelines here to increase capacity, if this were really necessary?
- Why is the Kremlin so interested in the implementation of this project (for 20 years) that everything is done to make it possible, and for this an ex-Federal Chancellor and his party silos are involved?
Gas Pipelines Russia – EU
In the following this becomes a bit clearer. Control over transport routes, pipelines, even power lines has always been a way to exert political influence, according to the old – also geopolitically valid and applied – divide et impera (Latin: divide and rule). Now you ask, what does a pipeline have to do with it? It is easily explained by looking at the dependence on gas supplies from Russia and considering that Nord Stream 2 (NS2) in effect bypasses our Eastern and Central European EU partners. This pipeline gives Russia the ability to deliver very large volumes of gas directly to Germany. While the delivery may not make sense in the long term, gas is planned as a bridge energy source to compensate for the loss of coal by 2037 and nuclear energy by the end of 2022.
However, unilateral dependence and a “bridge closure” – from either side – would lead to challenges for Germany. In addition, in the event of a conflict, gas supplies can be used by the Kremlin side specifically to divide the EU by supplying Germany exclusively but not its Eastern European neighbours. It will be particularly interesting if the storage capacities (intensively bought up by Gazprom and other Russian players or controlled by majority shareholdings) in southern Germany and neighbouring Austria are currently almost empty and larger quantities of gas are needed at short notice. In fact, the filling level of the underground natural gas storage facilities in Germany and Austria is lower this year than ever before [2]– a scoundrel who thinks evil of it, especially if no more pipeline capacities through Ukraine and Belarus/Poland have been bought from the Russian side for the next months.
Geopolitical Short-sightedness & Rope Ships
The NS2 project was launched by Nord Stream AG after preliminary planning in 2014 and subsequently massively supported by the then Minister of Economics Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) (now head of the Atlantic Bridge) and his successor Brigitte Zypries. From the very beginning, it was propagated as a purely economic project, as Nord Stream had been before. However, this was viewed more critically in neighbouring countries and attempts were made to enter into talks with Germany in various ways and at various levels in order to point out the geopolitical and monopoly-forming implications of the project. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as in the Ministry of Economy, people turned a deaf ear, which is not necessarily due to a lack of analytical ability [3].
In theory, therefore, there must have been a muzzling decree from the highest level directly from the SPD ranks installed there – earlier Steinmeier, later Gabriel, today Maas. Otherwise, it is factually impossible to explain that no connection was recognized here between the economic project and the geopolitical and market-dominating “weapon” that massively harms EU security interests.
Two German ministries worked closely together from 2015 to 2018 to push the project through swiftly at the federal level – under the leadership of Steinmeier, Gabriel, Zypries, and later Maas – and in the process also set a decisive course for the energy transition, which at its core is based on the “bridge technology” of natural gas that Nord Stream AG has been promoting for some time and thus a supply dependency on NS2.
On the part of Nord Stream AG, the project was lobbied, promoted and coordinated by the former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (who, according to his own account, has a strong male friendship with the Russian President), who has served as Chairman of the Shareholders’ Committee of Nord Stream AG since 2006 (and from 2016 also as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Nord Stream 2 AG). EU partners such as Poland expressed early concerns (from the end of 2015) and initially sought dialogue. The German government consistently turned a deaf ear, referring to the allegedly purely economic nature of the project and thus torpedoing any possibility of limiting the geopolitical risks of the project or defusing them altogether.
In addition, Germany obstructed a Polish project that would have enabled Poland to obtain gas via Germany, including from NS2, and to expand an existing pipeline for this purpose. Poland thus only had the option of initiating antitrust proceedings and filing a lawsuit before the ECJ; Germany suffered a resounding defeat in these proceedings; on July 15, 2021, the ECJ also rejected the appeals filed by Germany [4].
Extract from the press release No. 129/21 of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 15 July 2021 – “The legality of all acts of the Union institutions in the field of the Union’s energy policy must be assessed in the light of the principle of energy solidarity.”
The stubborn actions of the German government against EU security interests (which was confirmed by resolutions of the European Parliament) border on hypocrisy. On the one hand, it pretends to be European, while on the other hand, it cultivates old-guard relationships, acts in an obviously short-sighted manner, and refuses to engage in dialogue with EU partners and neighbours.
War is peace with the SPD
It is particularly interesting to see the dedication shown by SPD politicians such as Matthias Platzeck, the former Minister President of Brandenburg and also partly responsible for the airport debacle in Berlin, or the current Prime Minister of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Manuela Schwesig and her predecessor in office as head of government in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Erwin Sellering, or the current highly esteemed Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier (foreign minister during the decision-making phase of NS2) hail NS2 in the highest tones as a peace project [5]. The opposite is the case if one takes a closer look at the facts. As explained earlier, EU partners in Eastern Europe at any level have been criticized for fearing a geopolitical weapon to divide Europe. Attempts to defuse the situation, both diplomatically and through proposed structural measures to ensure security of supply for Eastern European partners, have been actively blocked by SPD ministries – at least that is how it appears to partners in the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic and other allied countries. On another level, too, the peace project seems more like an analogy to the novel 1984, in which the expression “war is peace” was coined.
One really cannot blame Russia for its actions; Russia clearly relies on real and geopolitics and, in the tradition of Carl Schmitt [6], uses every opportunity that presents itself to expand and consolidate its sphere of influence [7]. Regardless of whether the action on the German side was simple-mindedness or intentional, NS2 now has substantial potential to (further) divide the EU and prevent Germany from intervening in conflicts in areas where Russia has hegemonic claims on the EU side – in other words, to effectively neutralize Germany as an EU and NATO partner.
When winter approaches, Germany is certainly closest to itself. What do they care about the countries in Eastern and Central Europe if they can get gas via the North Stream 2 peace bridge and sit in their warm rooms? Of course, this option can certainly be used from the Russian side at some point; especially in combination with very empty natural gas storage facilities.
It also becomes interesting when you look at the timing between the start of the Ukraine war in 2014 and the official project start of NS2 in 2015. Opportunity makes thieves, but what does the SPD care about the stability of Europe or the credibility of Germany when the comrade is so close to economic interests. Normally, Germany should be the most reliable partner for our Eastern European neighbours right now – because of our history [8]. Russia’s objective should actually have been clear to all parties as early as 2000, when then Gazprom CEO Rem Vyakhirev said, “I will complete the pipeline to bypass Ukraine while I’m still alive” (at that time he meant the entire project – Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2) [9].
The current situation
One line of NS2 has been completed since June 2021, the second line should be ready in September, and the last kilometres of pipe will be laid in the Baltic Sea. Thus, the project is almost completed and Putin threatened Ukraine already in June at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum – with the active participation of personalities from German business and politics. Moreover, the Kremlin is now openly threatening others, invoking unification with Ukraine (i.e., its annexation) [10] and tuning the military and the population to a possible military conflict. For the objective of revising the breakup of the Soviet Union and extending Russia’s borders, or at least its hegemonic influence, back to the “old” borders of the Russian empire appears deeply embedded in the Kremlin’s goals.
The realization that only together with the resources of Ukraine and other countries it sees itself in a position to cope with the emerging challenges posed by China probably also plays a role in this. Of course, they would also like to (re)establish a geopolitical buffer zone vis-à-vis the West, which they believe to have lost. Therefore, it is understandable that on the part of the Kremlin a strategic blackmail potential has been built up against Germany for quite some time in order to use it for political pressure against Germany and at the same time to weaken Russia’s western neighbours in order to enforce its interests.
This becomes clear if we consider a situation in which our eastern neighbours in Poland, the Czech Republic, the Baltic States, but also Ukraine is deliberately excluded from supplies, while Germany continues to be deliberately supplied. In the past, we sat in the same boat and were forced and also willing to exert pressure on Russia together with the other affected countries in case of emergency. With NS2, one can and will keep a low profile in the event of a warning from Moscow. Combined with control over gas storage facilities, Russia could thus build up considerable blackmail potential.
Since the Caucasus war in 2008, and very clearly since the Crimean annexation in 2014, it has been apparent that the Kremlin is ready and willing to pursue the enforcement of its geopolitical interests in a consistent and targeted manner using all its available means. Verbally, too, members of the government and official representatives from Moscow leave no doubt about their goals. The gas storage facilities are empty, the pipelines are being cut, winter is approaching and the population would not be able to heat or would even have to take cold showers. A federal government would be quite cautious here if the warm shower were to be cut off, but one could also wash one’s hands of the situation: no one could have guessed that.
Currently, Gazprom has also booked no pipeline capacities for the transit of natural gas through the gas pipelines running via Belarus/Poland and Ukraine for the 4th quarter of 2021 and the first three quarters of 2022 (!!) – so we can already prepare ourselves for what may come our way. By the way, the current German government will no longer be in office by then.
If Russia really intends to force the annexation of Ukraine or parts of Ukraine [10] in order to come closer to the goal of restoring Russia to the old borders of the Soviet Union or to control that area, the threat or even use of the instruments of power described above are certainly not unlikely.
Partnership in Europe
Germany’s partners and neighbours in Eastern and Central Europe really have to face fear. Not only their geographic and historical perception is shaped by the fact that they have been repeatedly crushed, divided and sold between Germany/Austria/Prussia on the one hand and Russia on the other. Also, the current “bridge-building” actions, supplemented by an appeasement policy that has been fluctuating but steadily developing over 10 years in the face of an increasing aggression of the Kremlin towards our neighbours (but also the people in Russia), which in fact plays into the hands of the Kremlin, certainly does not increase the confidence of our eastern neighbours in the reliability of Germany. Especially not when Berlin repeatedly seeks dialogue with Russia, but at the same time consistently refuses to engage in dialogue with our direct neighbours and partners – at least with regard to NS2 (and energy supply) – or tries to assure them with friendly gestures. Whether it is intentional or just incompetence and gross negligence, all this has strongly contributed to the current low point in the reputation of German foreign and security policy in Eastern Europe. It should therefore come as no surprise if there are fears abroad of deliberate cooperation between the SPD ministers involved and the Kremlin, a distrust that has so far been understandably reserved for parties on the left or right.
Certainly, people abroad immediately think about corruption, mafia-like structures and old GDR rope teams when they look at the mix of events. Especially after the Council of Europe’s foreign ministers meeting in Helsinki on May 17, 2019, the impression solidified among our eastern neighbours that they were being sold out. There, the return of voting rights to Russia in the PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe), initiated by Germany and significantly lobbied by Foreign Minister Maas, was decided against the votes of Germany’s eastern neighbours and other states [11]. The Council of Europe had withdrawn Russia’s voting rights in 2014 as a result of the Crimean annexation and support for the secession of eastern Ukraine (Ukraine war). By returning its voting rights in the PACE, Germany and its supporters signalled to Russia that they had de facto come to terms with the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbass, at least in Berlin.
Moreover, the current NS2 deal between Germany and the U.S., ostensibly negotiated to take Ukraine’s security interests into account, has been celebrated in Germany as a success of German foreign policy – by our allies, on the other hand, it is seen as a victory for Russia. Neither Ukraine, nor our eastern neighbours, were included in the negotiations – again, they were deliberately left out by Berlin. In fact, Ukraine was warned against any criticism of the deal with the clear indication that this would jeopardize the securities and cooperation offers agreed for Ukraine in the area of climate change technologies and integration of Ukraine into European energy networks. In order for the deal to happen at all, Germany had to be effectively forced by the U.S. to make concessions to Ukraine. The agreement is not even an internationally binding treaty, and Ukraine is not granted any collateral that can actually be demanded. Whether the agreed concessions to Ukraine would be honoured by Germany in the event of an escalation of the conflict with Russia is another question. Thus, the sentence “… that is why we will perhaps – in the context of the “Green Deal” – need more gas from other countries such as the Soviet Union,” which Dr. Altmeier said as Minister of Economics and Energy at a press conference on July 7, 2020, sounds almost prophetic. While it was obviously a promise, it shows what his SPD predecessors left him in terms of energy policy and NS2 when he took office in 2018.
Thus, NS2 highlights the general and systematic failure of Merkel’s last three governments, especially in the foreign, economic, energy and finance ministries in the areas of energy transition, climate protection, European cooperation, security and stability in Europe, human rights, and foreign and security policy – with the main players coming from within the SPD or its immediate circle. And that Chancellor Merkel consciously went along with it. Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger noted on July 22, 2021, that he was greatly disturbed by the loss of confidence among partners and neighbours, that it represented a low point in German Ostpolitik unprecedented since 1990 [12].
But we PIRATES are clearly in opposition to such machinations, because we stand by our Eastern European neighbours. So, we also support our colleagues in e.g. the Czech Pirate Party, because the security interest of the Czech Republic or Poland or other partners is also the security interest of the Pirate Party Germany. We are the first party with a pan-European election program and we live Europe.
And by the way, I am of the opinion that the SPD should not occupy any positions related to foreign and security policy. Even 5% is too much for a party that has so systematically undermined and betrayed European security interests and values. From the outside, Germany looks like a corrupt banana republic. If one would perhaps still think about the power structures of Russia shown in the Nawalny video, it would also be noticeable that these have quite a lot of similarities and interconnections on the German side. It will become clear that these can certainly be continued up to Nord Stream 2, because the protagonists are the same.
[1] https://aussenpolitik.piratenpartei.de/2020/07/08/resilienz-in-deutschland-und-europa/
[4] https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2021-07/cp210129de.pdf
[5] https://www.cicero.de/aussenpolitik/interview-bundespraesident-steinmeier-nord-stream-2-ukraine/plus
[10] https://www.fr.de/politik/putin-droht-kiew-per-aufsatz-90859088.html
[12] https://twitter.com/ischinger/status/1418149011312291843
